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Abstract: It is a common view that arguments from analogy can only be evaluated 
on	a	case-by-case	basis.	However,	while	this	reflects	an	important	insight,	I	propose	
instead a relatively simple method for their evaluation based on just (i) their general 
form and (ii) four core questions. One clear advantage of this proposal is that it does 
not depend on any substantial (and controversial) view of similarity, unlike some in-
fluential	alternative	methods,	such	as	Walton’s.	Following	some	initial	clarification	
of the notion of analogy and similarity, I demonstrate the strength of this method by 
analysing and evaluating three prominent arguments from analogy. 
Keywords: Analogy, similarity, arguments from analogy, general form, evaluation.
Resumen: Es una visión común que los argumentos por analogía solo pueden ser 
evaluados	sobre	la	base	del	caso	a	caso.	No	obstante,	y	a	pesar	de	que	esto	refleja	un	
elemento importante, propongo un método simple para su evaluación basado en (i) 
su	forma	general	y	(ii)	cuatro	preguntas	medulares.	Siguiendo	algunas	clarificaciones	
iniciales sobre la noción de analogía y similaridad, demuestro la fuerza de este méto-
do analizando y evaluando tres argumementos por analogía prominentes.
Palabras clave: Analogía, similaridad, argumentos por analogía, forma general, 
evaluation.
1. Introduction
In both ordinary and academic thought and talk, a very common type of 
argument is arguments from analogy. It is natural, therefore, that such ar-
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guments are considered important to critical thinking and its textbooks. 
McKay (2000), Salmon (2012) and Kelley (2013), for instance, each de-
votes a chapter to them.1 However, there is no consensus on how such ar-
guments should be evaluated, so it is an open question how to tell whether 
or not a particular argument from analogy is cogent or not, good or bad. In 
this paper, I shall put forward a simple method for answering this question. 
Note that, other things being equal, the virtue of simplicity is particularly 
attractive for a subject area like critical thinking, which is highly orientated 
towards applications and practice. This includes, of course, the popular 
teaching of it to students from majors other than philosophy: often their 
focus has to be on the most applicable and simple parts of critical thinking 
in general and arguments from analogy in particular. 
In order to put forward such a method, we need two things. Firstly, we 
need to possess a proper understanding of what I shall call the “general 
form” of arguments from analogy. For only when we can put a given argu-
ment	from	analogy	in	its	general	form	are	we	able	to	explicate	it	sufficiently	
to evaluate it. Secondly, we need to know the basic questions or parameters 
for its evaluation given its general form (that is, roughly, a method for eval-
uating it given this general form). I shall propose such a general form and 
a total of four evaluation questions, based in particular on work by McKay 
(2000) and Divers (1997). Putting an argument from analogy into this gen-
eral form and answering the four evaluation questions jointly provide a 
method for how to evaluate an argument from analogy. 
2. Analogy and Similarity
As pointed out by Juthe (2005), a considerable proportion of reasoning 
using analogy actually is not in the form of arguments. A lot of use of analo-
gies instead consists in attempts at describing phenomena and enhancing 
our understanding of them; in particular, phenomena that are unfamiliar 
to us. But as Juthe himself, I shall focus on reasoning with analogies that 
involve	“arguments	from	analogy”.	However,	for	this	we	first	need	to	briefly	
1 Their importance is by no means universally recognised, however: Fisher (2004), for 
example, does not even seem to mention them (though Fisher (2011) does).
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expound the notion of analogy in itself. At the heart of this notion is the 
concept of similarity.
To call something “an analogy” or “analogous” is to say that it is similar 
to something else, in a respect that is understood in the context in which it 
is claimed. To say that two cases are analogous or that one is an analogy of 
the other is thus to make a certain comparison between the two cases. The 
first	case	we	shall	call	the	theme; the second case, which is claimed to be 
analogous to the theme, we shall call the analogue. The analogy is the re-
lationship of similarity between the two.2 In the so-called “descriptive” use 
of analogies, they are used merely to describe the theme. Consider an in-
teresting example of the descriptive use of analogy (McKay, 2000, p. 102): 
“The galaxies are receding from each other like raisins in a pudding that is 
spreading	out	over	the	floor.”	Using	this	analogy	makes	the	claims	there	is	
a similarity between the galaxies receding from another (the theme) and 
the	raisins	receding	from	another	in	a	pudding	spreading	out	over	the	floor	
(the analogue). It is this feature of similarity that is the most basic feature 
of an analogy. Indeed, the descriptive use of analogy is a special case of a 
simile	–	a	very	common	figure	of	speech	in	which	something	is	likened	to	
something else, usually preceded by the word “as” or, as in this example, 
“like”, e.g. “He was cold as ice” and “Love is like a rollercoaster”.3
While the descriptive use of analogy in itself does not play any very im-
portant role in arguments in our sense, it is very useful in general thought 
and talk. For it provides a helpful way of making vivid something that is 
difficult	to	visualise.	Raisins	spreading	in	a	pudding	on	the	floor	is	easy	to	
picture, but galaxies spreading from one another certainly is not, and simi-
larly in other cases of the descriptive use of analogy. 
A descriptive use of analogy often suggests that there are more than one 
respect of similarity between the theme and the analogue, or more precise-
ly, more than one property shared by the theme and the analogue. This is a 
general feature of analogies – and points to a general problem with them: 
their scope. It is often not very clear how many features the theme and the 
2 The word “analogy” is commonly also used for the analogue itself, but it is useful to 
have	a	specific	term	for	it	(“analogue”).
3 Not to be confused with metaphors, which do not assert similarity, but attribute a 
property or make a claim of identity in a non-literal sense without the use of “like” or “as”, 
e.g. “His eyes were burning with anger” and “She is a rising star”.
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analogue are supposed to share. Raisins in a pudding spreading out over 
the	floor	recede	from	each	other	derivatively	on	the	spreading	out	of	the	
pudding;	specifically,	as	parts	of	the	spreading	out	of	the	material	they	are	
embedded in. But it is not clear if the analogy suggests that this is also the 
way galaxies recede from each other. 
This	uncertainty	about	the	scope	of	analogy	is	reflected	in	a	general	in-
determinacy in the evaluation of arguments from analogy. It is arguably 
one of the main reasons why these arguments have to be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis, as is often held. One way round this predicament is 
per	haps	to	provide	a	definition	or	theory	of	similarity	that	fits	in	with	the	
evaluation of ar guments from analogy. A lot of effort in the literature on is 
devoted to this: see, for instance, Walton (2012). The method I am propos-
ing here, howev er, does not require any particular substantial of similar-
ity. Accordingly, in the following section, I shall attempt to apply one and 
the same “general” method to three different examples of arguments from 
analogy, all the while being as quiet as possible about similarity. 
3. Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy
In an argument from analogy, the analogy is used to draw the conclusion 
that a thing or case has a certain property because it is similar to another 
case	which	has	that	property.	Specifically,	it	is	held	that	a	certain	case	A,	the	
analogue, is similar to another case T, the theme; that A has the property G; 
and that therefore T has property G too.  
Accordingly, a more precise rendering of the form of arguments from 
analogy on this construal is this:
The General Form of Arguments from Analogy
(P1) A (the analogue) and T (the theme) are similar (analogous) in that they 
both have properties F1,…, Fn. 
(P2) A has the additional property G.
\ T has the property G.4
4 This is very much a “traditional” formulation of the form of arguments from analogy, 
which found one of its classic expressions in Thomas Reid”s Essays on the Intellectual 
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Consider now an example of an argument from analogy:
Case 1:
The balance of payments is a measure of economic health, not a cause of 
it;	restricting	imports	to	reduce	that	deficit	is	like	sticking	the	thermom-
eter in ice water to bring down a feverish temperature.5
Here the conclusion, which is merely implied, is that one should not re-
strict	 imports	in	order	to	reduce	the	payment	deficit.	To	understand	this	
argument,	 let	us	first	say	that	trying	to	reduce	a	feverish	temperature	by	
sticking the thermometer in ice water is trying to change bodily health by 
manipulating one of its indicators (temperature). The author implies that 
(i) one cannot reduce a feverish temperature in this way and – arguably – 
also that one should not try to do so. Let us further say that trying to reduce 
a	payment	deficit	by	restricting	 imports	 is	 likewise	trying	to	change	eco-
nomic	health	by	manipulating	one	of	its	indicators	(a	payment	deficit).	The	
author	implies	that	(ii)	one	cannot	reduce	a	payment	deficit	that	way	either	
and – arguably again – also that one should not try to do it. 
Thus, the example instantiates the general form of arguments from analogy 
as follows:
(1) Bodily health and economic health are similar in that they both have 
properties F1,…, Fn. 
(2) Bodily health has the additional property of “not being changeable by 
manipulation of its indicators” and one should not try to do this (such that 
one cannot reduce a feverish temperature by sticking a thermometer in ice 
water and should not try to do this).
\ Economic health has the property of “not being changeable by manipu-
Powers of Man	(Essay	1,	Ch.	4).	An	influential	similar	formulation	among	contemporary	
authors is Walton’s “argumentation scheme” for arguments from analogy (Walton et al., 
pp. 56, 315). 
5 Michael Kinsley, “Keep Trade Free”, The New Republic, vol. 188 (1983), p. 111, quoted 
in McKay (2000, p. 110). 
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lation of its indicators” and one should not try to do this (such that one 
cannot	reduce	a	payment	deficit	by	restricting	imports	and	should	not	try	
to do this).
The	clarification	of	the	argument	obtained	by	putting	it	in	general	form	
like this will enable us to formulate the core questions required for evalua-
tion of arguments from analogy. What should these questions “ask to”, i.e. 
concern? They should not concern whether or not arguments from anal-
ogy are deductively valid, since, I shall assume, arguments from analogy 
are deductively invalid.6 Rather, they should concern how “reasonable” the 
argument is. “Reasonable” means “agreeable to reason”, a notion that I 
shall	not	attempt	to	elucidate	here	(it	suffices	for	our	purposes	to	take	it	as	
primitive). An argument from analogy can be more or less reasonable. The 
more reasonable it is, the better it is; and conversely, the less reasonable it 
is, the worse it is. Unfortunately, there are not any straightforward criteria 
for when an argument from analogy is reasonable. We can, however, as 
pointed out by Divers (1997), ask the following four questions when trying 
to evaluate an argument from analogy, and this will get us a long way:
Divers’ Four Core Questions for Arguments from Analogy 
(Q1) Which two cases, A and T, are claimed to be similar (analogous)?
(Q2) (i) What (property or) properties F1,…, Fn are supposed to make A 
and T similar (and from which further similarity is inferred) and (ii) is this 
supposition reasonable?
(Q3) What property G is attributed to T in the conclusion?
(Q4) (i) What kind of connection is supposed to exist between F1,…, Fn and 
G and (ii) is this supposition reasonable? 
These questions are endorsed from Divers (ibid.), though the evaluative ad-
ditions (Q2ii) and (Q4ii) are my own. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
6 This is not an uncontroversial assumption (cf. e.g. Shecaira, 2013), but one that need 
not concern us in this paper. 
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give any independent account of them. For our present purposes, they are 
simply	to	be	taken	at	face	value	and	justified	by	the	work	they	are	brought	
to do below. They are my version of Walton’s “critical questions” for ar-
guments from analogy: as Walton points out, any argumentation scheme 
(my “general form”) has associated with it a set of such “critical” questions 
which can be used in the evaluation of the type of argument represented by 
the scheme (Walton et al 2008, pp. 15ff). Walton’s own set of critical ques-
tions for his argumentation scheme for arguments from analogy (ibid., p. 
315)	mainly	concerns	the	notion	of	similarity	(specifically,	2	of	the	3	ques-
tions constituting the set). In line with his emphasis on this notion, he puts 
forward models of similarity using so-called “stories” or “scripts” from ar-
tificial	intelligence	(Walton	2012;	Walton	2013,	pp.	34-38).	As	mentioned	
above,	 the	method	 I	 propose	here	 attempts	 to	 sidestep	 specific	 views	 of	
similarity. I believe this is one of its advantages – especially for the pur-
poses of teaching arguments from analogy in critical thinking – but this is 
not something I shall discuss in the present paper. 
Of Divers’ four questions, it is (Q2) and Q(4) that are critical; (Q1) and 
(Q3)	are	only	needed	for	specification	of	the	parameters	A,	T	and	G.	Is	it	
reasonable	to	postulate	the	property	or	properties	identified	in	the	answer	
to	(Q2),	and	is	it	reasonable	to	postulate	the	kind	of	connection	identified	
in the answer to (Q4)? If, and only if, the answers to both of these ques-
tions	are	affirmative,	we	shall	say	that	the	argument	from	analogy	in	case	
as a whole is “reasonable”. If, on the contrary, the answer to one or both of 
them is “no”, we might choose to say that the argument from analogy is a 
fallacy of false analogy.
To see these questions at work, let us answer each of them for Case 1:
 
(1) It is easy to determine that the two things that are claimed to be anal-
ogous are bodily health (A) and economic health (T), thereby answering 
(Q1).
(2) By contrast, it is not as easy to answer (Q2). For in Case 1, as in many 
other arguments from analogy, the (property or) properties which are sup-
posed to make the theme and the analogue similar are not made explicit. 
Fortunately, however, we can normally infer which (property or) proper-
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ties the proponent of the argument is tacitly assuming to be involved. Thus, 
in this example, it seems clear that both the state of the economy involved 
and the state of the body involved are claimed to be cases of “health”. So 
A (bodily health) and T (economic health) are assumed to share “health-
related” properties such as “being more or less wholesome,” “depending for 
its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts”, and so on.  
Is this supposition reasonable? Yes, intuitively, just like we often talk of 
the “health” of complex systems other than bodies, including computers, 
cars, families, teams, societies etc., and assume they share “health-related” 
properties with bodies, it seems to be a reasonable assumption that both 
the state of the body and the state of the economy share the mentioned 
features.
(3)	Like	the	first	question,	(Q3)	can	be	answered	trivially.	The	property	G	
attributed to T (economic health) in the conclusion is, as stated explicitly 
in the general form for the argument, simply the property of “not being 
changeable by manipulation of its indicators”. 
(4)	The	final	question,	(Q4),	however,	is	more	difficult.	The	connection	be-
tween the shared (property or) properties F1,…, Fn and the property G at-
tributed to economic health in the conclusion is probably assumed by the 
proponent of the argument to be similar if not identical to the connection 
between these properties and G for the analogue (bodily health). If so, it is 
arguably some kind of law-like connection which determines connections 
between properties and what is and what is not possible. 
Is this supposition reasonable? Yes, it is. For it is it plausible that there 
is a law-like connection which rules out that it is possible for a state to 
have the properties of “being more or less wholesome,” “depending for its 
wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts” etc. (F1,…, Fn) and simul-
taneously to lack the negative property of “not being changeable by ma-
nipulation of its indicators” (G). We certainly have strong evidence based 
on observations of bodily health that such a connection holds for it. There 
is a question of which sense of “possible” is afoot here, but this we need 
not go into. For whichever it is, it seems very plausible that if the theme, 
here economic health, also has F1,…, Fn – and, as mentioned, that seems 
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a reasonable assumption – then it too has G. In short, this argument from 
analogy is reasonable.
Let us consider a second case of an argument from analogy, and employ 
again our method of the general form and the four core questions. The fol-
lowing is from an essay by C.S. Lewis:
Case 2:
You can get a large audience together for a strip-tease act – that is, to 
watch a girl undress on the stage. Now suppose that you came to a coun-
try	where	you	could	fill	a	theatre	simply	by	bringing	a	covered	plate	onto	
the stage and then slowly lifting the cover so as to let everyone else see, 
just before the lights went out, that it contained a mutton chop or a bit 
of bacon, would you not think that in that country something had gone 
wrong with the appetite for food? (1952, p. 75)
The	analogue	(A)	here	is	mutton	chop/appetite	for	food	and	the	theme	(T)	
is	strip-tease	shows/appetite	for	sex.	Of	course,	this	analogue	is	imagined	
only, but this does not matter for our purposes.7 The example instantiates 
the general form like this:
(P1) Appetite for food (mutton chop) and appetite for sex (strip-tease 
shows) are similar in that they both have properties F1,…, Fn. 
(P2) Appetite for food has the additional property of having gone wrong 
(having become unhealthy) when it attracts a large audience who pay to 
have it peeked by watching unveiling of its objects on stage. 
\ Appetite for sex has the property of having gone wrong when it attracts 
a large audience who pay to have it peeked by watching unveiling of its 
objects on stage.
7 Since the analogue is imagined only, we might say, using the terminology of Govier 
(2012), that this is an example of an a priori argument from analogy, as opposed to the 
inductive argument from analogy of Case 1. 
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Consider next the four core questions:
(1) It is easy to determine that the two things that are claimed to be analo-
gous	are	unveiled	mutton	chop/appetite	for	food	(A)	and	strip-tease	shows/
appetite for sex (T). 
(2) The property or properties that are supposed to make A and T similar 
are that, roughly, people will gather (and pay) to have this appetite stim-
ulated/peeked	 by	 “teasing”	 presentation	 of	 its	 object	 on	 stage	 (which	 of	
course is merely imagined in case of the food appetites). 
In my view, this (imagined) similarity does not seem reasonable. There 
are similarities between appetite for food and appetite for sex, such as both 
of them having a physiological underpinning, but one of the major dissimi-
larities is that it is entirely normal (in a certain cross-cultural sense) for a 
huge part of the appetite (drive) for sex to be directed at other objects than 
the biological act of sex it self – indeed, on some views, such as perhaps 
those of Freud, more or less everything. By contrast, this is arguably not 
the case for appetite for food: it is mainly only directed at food itself, and 
derivatively only at its closely related antecedents, such as anticipating eat-
ing or cooking. Thus, the analogy is not plausible. 
(3) Like in our previous example, it is easy to answer (Q3). The property 
attributed to T in the conclusion is the property of having gone wrong. 
(4) Finally, we come to (Q4). The connection between F1,…, Fn and the 
property of having gone wrong may be that F1,…, Fn concern natural ap-
petites whose satisfaction are incompatible with the “wrong” behaviour 
mentioned by Lewis, or something along those lines. Recall in any case 
that a good evaluation in the answer to each of (Q4) and (Q2) is a necessary 
condition for the argument in case being reasonable, and since we already 
demonstrated that this is not the case for (Q2), we do not need to attend 
very carefully to (Q4). 
Thus we can conclude that Lewis’s argument from analogy is not reason-
able. In a more formal manner of speaking, it is “fallacious”. 
The fact that an argument from analogy can fail as an argument is, like 
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the general problem with the scope of analogies mentioned above, related 
to the notion of similarity (“being analogous to”). Everything is similar to 
everything	else	in	indefinitely	many	respects.	For	that	reason,	in	a	sense,	
anything can be said to be an analogy of any entity! To avoid this trivialisa-
tion of analogies – and to avoid committing the fallacy of false analogy – it 
is important to be aware of which properties are singled out and claimed 
to be shared by the theme and the analogue. They should be non-trivial 
properties and they should be properties that concern important aspects 
of each. The properties which we found reasonable in our analysis of Case 
1 – “being more or less wholesome,” “depending for its wholesomeness on 
the functioning of its parts”, and so on – are good examples of such prop-
erties. What such properties are varies from case to case. But we can say 
something general about what they are not. They are not properties such 
as “being an entity”, “being self-identical”, “being coloured if green”, and 
other properties which necessarily applies to any object whatsoever. For 
since they apply to any object, the similarity that comes from sharing them 
is precisely not non-trivial. 
But clearly, as our method of evaluation shows, no such trivial proper-
ties are involved in Case 2. Nonetheless, one might have had a knee-jerk 
reaction to this argument as being weak anyway, holding that the element 
of disanalogy uncovered in the answer to (Q2) simply is too obvious.
Consider, therefore, an argument from analogy where it in any case is 
not obvious whether the analogy is implausible or not. The following pas-
sage from a classic work by Viktor Frankl is our example of this:
Case 3:
A man’s suffering is similar to the behaviour of a gas. If a certain quan-
tity	of	gas	 is	pumped	 into	an	empty	chamber,	 it	will	fill	 the	chamber	
evenly,	no	matter	how	big	the	chamber.	Thus	suffering	completely	fills	
the human soul and conscious mind, no matter whether the suffering 
is	great	or	little.	Therefore	the	“size”	of	human	suffering	is	[…]	relative.	
(1946, p. 55)
The analogue A here is the size of a certain quantity of gas and the theme T 
the “size” of human suffering. Frankl seems to be implicitly assuming some 
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kind	of	equivalence	between	the	alleged	fact	that	suffering	completely	fills	
the human soul and conscious mind and its “size” being relative. If so, on 
a charitable reading of the quoted passage, he is also implicitly assuming 
some (very similar) kind of equivalence between the alleged fact that a gas 
fills	an	empty	chamber	and	its	size	being	relative.	These	assumptions	are	
problematic,	but	fortunately	not	something	we	need	to	go	into	here.	Suffice	
is to say that, given these assumptions, we should not really separate the 
passage’s explicit conclusion of suffering’s “size” being relative from the 
claim	of	its	completely	filling	the	human	soul	and	conscious	mind.	Let	us	
do this in the comparatively informal manner of the following formulation 
of the general form of the argument:
(1) The behaviour of a gas and human suffering are similar in that they both 
have properties F1,…, Fn. 
(2) A quantity of gas (big or small) has the additional property that when 
pumped	into	a	chamber,	it	fills	it	evenly,	no	matter	how	big	the	chamber;	
that is, its size is relative.
\	Human	suffering	has	the	property	that	that	it	completely	fills	the	human	
soul and conscious mind, whether the suffering is great or small; that is, its 
size is relative. 
Let us next answer the four core questions for this argument:
(1) As already mentioned, the two things that are claimed to be analogous 
are the size of a certain quantity of gas (A) and the “size” of human suffer-
ing (T).
(2) The property or properties that are supposed to make A and T similar in 
this case are that, roughly, a gas occupying a chamber is similar to human 
suffering “occupying” the conscious mind. 
Is it plausible to postulate this property? Well, that depends on how we 
consider the highly metaphorical claim that there is the involved similar-
ity. We of course commonly employ analogies and metaphors (the differ-
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ence between analogies and metaphors does not matter to our purposes 
here) in our thought and talk about mental matters, e.g. when we claim 
there is a gap – analogous to a spatial gap – between thinking about do-
ing something and actually doing it, and we often do this as a matter of 
course (Johnson and Lakoff 2003). But this takes place with common (and 
“dead”) metaphors, and it is one thing to use such common metaphors, it 
is quite another to use a highly speculative and controversial one as Frankl 
does here.8	Thus,	without	a	lot	of	independent	justification,	I	would	argue	
that positing this similarity and hence the involved property is implausible.
 
(3) Like in our previous examples, it is straightforward to answer (Q3). The 
property attributed to T in the conclusion is stated explicitly there: Hu-
man suffering has the property that its “size” is relative in the sense that it 
completely	fills	the	human	soul	and	conscious	mind,	whether	the	suffering	
is great or small. 
(4) Finally, we come to (Q4). However, since we have already seen that 
the similarity, or property, allegedly shared by A and T is not plausible, we 
have	sufficient	reason	to	conclude	that	this	argument	from	analogy	is	not	
reasonable. The answer to (Q4), whatever it may be, is thus not needed in 
this case either. 
In Frankl’s case, like in Lewis’s, the failure of the argument is thus already 
exposed in the answer to (Q2), halfway through the four core questions. By 
contrast, in our example of a “reasonable” argument from analogy – Case 
1 above – we need to go through every one of the questions. In future re-
search, I intend to investigate if this asymmetric pattern can be generalized 
to all arguments from analogy susceptible to the simple method of evalua-
tion advocated in the present paper. 
8 It may be that the “size” of suffering is relative in the sense at issue – a view which 
Frankl argues for in various ways – and if so, it is reasonable to liken it to the adduced fact 
about a gas. But whether or not this controversial view is correct is a matter independent of 
the evaluation of the present argument from analogy in itself. 
A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen
122
4. Conclusion 
If what I have argued in this paper is correct, my proposed method for eval-
uation of arguments from analogy is able to do useful work. This method 
consists only of the general form of these arguments along with four “criti-
cal questions”. Importantly, it is simpler than other methods that rely on a 
substantial notion of similarity, such as Walton’s. As we saw, it is true that 
the notion of similarity is central to the notion of analogy, and my method 
of course mentions the former. But, perhaps ironically, it does not require 
any particular view of this notion. Since it is thus not burdened by having to 
carry	on	its	shoulders	an	accompanying	definition,	model	or	theory	of	simi-
larity,	it	is	simple	and	flexible.	This	makes	it	fit	in	well	with	the	common	
view that arguments from analogy should be evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. Of course, further theoretical work is needed to compare in detail my 
method with Walton’s and others’ similarity-orientated theories. In addi-
tion, other, more applied, research incorporating education science is re-
quired	to	argue	for	my	specific	view	that	my	method	is	superior	in	the	con-
text of teaching of arguments from analogy in critical thinking. But at this 
point, I hope some initial proof of my method’s pudding has been shown by 
the use of it in the present paper.9
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